Social Media and Electoral Strategies: Evidence from Indonesian Legislative Branch

by

Jennifer Frentasia

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Frendy Sugito Tjong and Tati Malina, my sister, Alyssa Novelia, and my brothers, Ryan Adrianto and Ivan Renata

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Social media websites are on their heyday. The leading social media website, Facebook, was reaching 700 million users by mid-2011, while Twitter is coming close at 500 million users by February 2012[1]. One of the explanations behind its popularity is the network effect: social media's utility increases when more people use it. The utility comes from the users finding social media more effective and efficient in reaching a larger number of people and the information they provide (Dijk 2006). Social media, however, is particularly fascinating because it differs from traditional media such as newspapers and television in three important ways: (1) it is able to facilitate two-way interaction with a large number of people at the same time; (2) actors are connected with each other directly, without middlemen that control contents; (3) and popular social media websites are free to join, making the cost of usage very low by modern standard. These advantages lead to an important conclusion: social media makes it easy for people to evaluate their counterparts' actions and therefore beneficial as an electoral strategy.

Realizing the potential benefits, political actors have started to use social media as a crucial part in electoral strategy. The success of Barack Obama's presidential campaign in 2008 that relied heavily on social media has encouraged even more politicians to utilize them (Miller 2008). This is not merely a phenomenon observed in the United States (U.S.); many parts of the world with internet access see a growth of politicians using social media for campaigning purposes, such as during the Singapore General Election 2011[2]. Yet, despite the advantages, one

[1] Smith, Catharine. 2011. "Facebook Users Number Almost 700 Million: Report." *Huffington Post*, May 31. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/31/facebook-users-number-almost-700-million_n_868967.html (March 15, 2012)
Hachman, Mark. 2011. "Twitter Continues to Soar in Popularity, Site's Numbers Reveal." *PC Mag*, September 8. http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2392658,00.asp (March 15, 2012)

[2] Russel, Jon. 2011. "Singapore Elections: Nicole Seah and the Social Media Effect." *Asian Correspondent*, April 26. http://asiancorrespondent.com/53134/singapore-elections-nicole-seah-and-the-social-media-effect/ (November30, 2011)

can observe a variation in politicians' usage of social media in new democracies. From the original data that I collected, almost 59% of legislators in Indonesia's *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (translated as People's Representation Council and equivalent to the House of Representatives) have used social media as of 2011, while 41% has not. Even between those politicians who use social media, there are variations in their strategies. So why do some politicians choose to use social media as part of their electoral strategy, while the others do not, and what explains the variation in their social media strategies? This thesis seeks to answer this question.

I choose Indonesia as the case study of this thesis because it is a young democracy, with competitive and fair elections, as well as a high variation in the demographic, which makes it a perfect ground to test my hypotheses. According to a report published by International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 51% of Indonesians vote for the same party most of the times, compared to 41% who always vote for different parties. This shows that Indonesian voters' core and swing divisions are quite even. Indonesians also state that they prefer to vote for a candidate directly (77%) rather than to vote for only a party (17%). In making their selections, however, candidate's personality is still the most important factor (40%), compared to other qualities such as candidate's platform (11%), and party affiliation (5%) (IFES 2010). The variety of voters and their preferences lead candidates to use a variety of strategies, such as policy-based strategies to target swing districts, and valence-based strategies to target core districts. In terms of their campaigns, there is also a certain balance between party-mobilization strategies and personal-mobilization strategies. What I am interested in this thesis is that as an electoral strategy, whether social media aids party or personal vote mobilization, and whether social media complements valence or policy-based strategies. The main findings of this thesis are social media is a personal-vote mobilization tool, and it complements policy-based strategies.

The literature of electoral politics suggests some explanations on why we see the variation in politicians' social media usage. Using the electoral system approach, one could argue that since Indonesia has only adopted the open-list proportional representation (open-list PR) system in the 2009 elections, Indonesian politicians are still reluctant in intensifying their personal campaigns, including the usage of social media. This explanation, however, does not take into account that post-Suharto elections in Indonesia are highly competitive, which gives no reasons why politicians would not adapt to the new electoral rules. Just like any system with proportional representation, Indonesia uses multi-member districts, whereby a number of people represent a district, instead of just one in single-member districts in the U.S[3]. What sets the open-list PR different from other PR systems is that voters have the ability to choose for candidates within lists formed by parties. Where each voter has a single vote like in Indonesia, the open-list increases intra-party competition between candidates because each candidate has to fight with each other to secure those single votes. The open-list PR in Indonesia, however, is also unique because voters can cast their single votes to choose for either a party or an individual candidate. These rules lead us to expect that electoral campaigns in Indonesia aim towards gaining individual votes, although party-based campaigning still maintains its significance in politicians' electoral strategies through the possibility of gaining party votes (Carey and Shugart 1995).

Party-centered approach proposes a different answer: party characteristics determine the party's electoral strategies, which leads to the differences in party members' behaviors. Randall and Svåsand (2002) developed a framework that is very useful in comparing party characteristics as their work focused on party institutionalization in new democracies. By party

[3] Amy, Douglas J. 2005. "How Proportional Representation Elections Work." *PR Library: Readings in Proportional Representation,* April 8. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/howprwor.htm (March 27, 2012).

institutionalization, they mean the establishment process of a party in terms of its patterns of behavior, attitude and culture. Using this approach, one could argue the difference in social media mandate is caused by the uneven levels of institutionalization of individual parties. Scholars agree that Golkar (*Partai Golongan Karya* or Functional Groups Party) and PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or Prosperous Justice Party) are two parties in Indonesia that have relatively high level of institutionalization, compared with other parties inside and outside the DPR (Tomsa 2008). The high institutionalization leads to social media mandates because it enables parties to develop newer and more sophisticated electoral strategies, which is why Golkar and PKS are still the only ones to enact formal party policy towards social media[4]. Between the two parties that have social media mandate, however, there could be a variation in social media usage. We expect that the difference in how Golkar and PKS are institutionalized explains how their members behave differently in their usage of social media.

Another approach focuses on the district characteristics, which means the characteristics of constituencies, such as the distance from capital, level of poverty, level of education attainment, and the district size, explain the differences in politicians' electoral strategies. Fenno (1978) argues that legislators electoral strategies in their districts, or home style, are results of contextual constraints such as the district's demographic, and other legislators' strategies; personal constraints such as his experience, interest and, abilities; as well as strategical constraints of being in protectionist or expansionist phases. The logic is that legislators need to know what kind

[4] Purwoko, Krisman. 2011. "Kader PKS Wajib Punya Akun Facebook dan Twitter." *Republika*, 12 February. http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nusantara/11/02/12/163900-kader-pks-wajib-punya-akun-facebook-dan-twitter (November 1, 2011)

Sihaloho, Markus Junianto. 2011. "Golkar Says the Future of Election Success Is in Facebook and Twitter." *Jakarta Globe*, 25 July. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/golkar-says-the-future-of-election-success-is-in-facebook-and-twitter/454984 (November 16, 2011)

of district he or she is representing, so that they can strategize their campaigns more effectively, given the limitations in resources, such as time and money. This approach leads us to expect that expansionist legislators and those from swing districts, who often resort to policy-oriented strategies, will utilize more social media than protectionist legislators and those from core districts, because the social media complements their policy-oriented strategies.

What I propose in this research is to combine the insights from the literature of electoral politics with the theories of internet campaigning. The "cyber-optimists" and "cyber-skeptics" camps in the literature of web campaigning claim that internet provides less powerful political actors with the opportunities to increase their political presence and engagement, as it gives them a space for non-traditional message delivery (Rheingold 1993; Rash 1997; Norris 2001; Gibson et al 2003). This theory helps to solve the limitations of the electoral politics literature because it separates political actors based on balance of power, and suggests that the power relations determine which actors benefit from internet campaign the most. Though the theory is promising, the scholars in this field have not succeeded in showing how power relations in domestic politics lead to different instrument choices in internet campaigning. This is because the prominent tools in web sphere, politicians' websites or homepages, often existed just for formality, and not even regularly maintained. The poorly maintained websites are difficult to study, as they do not reflect candidates' electoral motives, which is why they tend to provide only basic information about the candidate, party, election, and the legislative body, rather than being a vote mobilization tool (Van Os, Voerman, and Jankowski 2007; Gregor 2007).

This thesis on social media and electoral strategies will contribute to the literature by focusing on social media, which politicians personally maintain, and have designs that encourage more issue-based web posts. I collected an original data on legislators' use of social media with

independent variables on legislator's attributes, district characteristics, and parties for 399 legislators who currently sit in Indonesia's DPR. The detailed data helps to tease out the variables that matter in the quantitative analysis, which give clues to the legislators' motives in using social media. I argue that—controlling for other covariates like legislator's attributes, district characteristics, and political parties—policy-based legislators are more likely to utilize social media as part of their electoral strategies, rather than valence-based legislators. This is because policy-based legislatures, disadvantaged by the nature of Indonesian politics, benefit the most from the social media campaign.

This chapter serves two purposes for this thesis: to give an overview of Indonesia, including the political background and the development of internet usage in the country; and to lay out the literature review in electoral politics. The Chapter 2 discusses the research design of the thesis, where I will go through my research question, hypotheses, as well as data and methodologies used. Chapter 3 focuses on the paper's empirical results, interpreting the regression analysis and discussing the significance of the quantitative findings. Chapter 4 is devoted to qualitative analysis, in order to solve the questions unanswered by empirical findings: which electoral strategy (valence vs. policy) do social media complement? And what kind of vote-mobilization tool (party vs. personal) is social media? I compare two well-known legislators, one from Golkar and another from PKS, in their Twitter usage. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings in this paper and concludes the analysis by discussing the broader implications of this research.

1.1 Overview of Indonesia

Since its independence in 1945 until the 1998 revolution, Indonesia did not have democratic government, except for a short period in 1950s. The first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, ruled under the auspices of a political system called Guided Democracy, as he believed that democracy was incompatible with the political instability the country was going through. In 1965, Sukarno was overthrown in a military coup led by General Suharto against him and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Suharto became the second President in 1966 and his regime is known as the New Order, a term used to compare his government and Sukarno's (Old Order). Indonesia became an authoritarian system with one-party dominance by Golkar (*Golongan Karya* or Functional Groups) until 1998, when Suharto was forced to end his rule in the wake of Asian Financial Crisis. Since then, Indonesia has enacted numerous constitutional reforms that offer greater freedoms and power to the people; it became an electoral democracy in 1999, directly elected the President in 2004, and implemented open-list proportional representation in 2009 (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010).

Despite the democratic transition, the quality of politicians, political parties, and parliament in Indonesia is still weak. The public is fed every day with news on corruption, bribery, faction conflicts, and low quality work, making the reputation of politics very negative in the country (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010). This is partly due to the lack of parties with high institutionalization, which leads to poor programs and human resources in politics. Parties in Indonesia do not base their platforms on policies, as they mostly rely on personalistic appeal of party leaders, or other nostalgic appeal. Political campaigns in Indonesia also reflect these problems: "in Indonesia en election campaign is not the time to communicate a sophisticated platform or programme. Rather, it is the time to showcase charismatic leaders (often flanked by *dangdut* celebrities), display easily recognizable party symbols and stage colorful mass rallies"

(Tomsa 2008, 176). Regarding the role of media in Indonesian politics, although the press continues to be critical in reporting politicians' performances, other media outlets like television, has actually enhanced the practice of traditional politics that the press criticizes. Eye-catching party advertisements on TV aid name recognition greatly and reduce the need for membership mobilization based on ideology or issue. This has been proven by the successful campaigns of *Partai Demokrat*, the new party that rode on the popularity of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004 and 2009 elections (Tomsa 2008).

Elections in Indonesia use the proportional representation (PR) system since 1999, though the rules are still fine-tuned. In 1999 election, the people voted for parties that would sit in the parliament, and the parliament voted for the president on behalf of the citizens. The people have directly elected the president since 2004, and parties that have at least 25% popular vote or 20% DPR seats are eligible to nominate its own presidential candidate. For parties that pass the electoral threshold of 2.5% to enter DPR but do not meet the nomination criteria, they can form coalition with other parties to nominate candidates together. For the legislative elections, Indonesia used the closed-list PR in 1999, followed by semi-open PR in 2004, and finally open-list PR in 2009. In the most recent DPR election, voters can vote for either a candidate only, a party only, or a pair of candidate with the party he/she represents; any voting possibility constitutes a single non-transferable vote for the party. Only parties that passed the 2.5% electoral threshold get seats allocation in DPR; the calculation of seats is per electoral district using the largest remainder method[5]. After each party in a district gets the number of total seats

[5] The formula is as followed: 1) Calculate BPP or *bilangan pembagi pemilih* (electoral divisor), which is the total number of valid votes divided by total number of seats allocated in a district. 2) Divide each party's valid votes in the district with the district's BPP to get the automatic seats. 3) Calculate the number of remainder seats and allocate them to parties with highest remainders.

per district, the seats are given to its top candidates in terms of individual votes. The electoral rules seem to encourage both party-based and candidate-based campaigns.

In regards to voting behavior, Indonesianist scholars continue to be divided in their approach of analyzing the electoral politics trends. Those who utilize the older approach of *aliran* (literally means "streams") politics focus on the sociological characteristics of the constituencies, such as divisions in Islam, and believe that social cleavages in Indonesia determine the elections' results as each social group, such as different streams of Islam, is represented by a political party in Indonesia (King 2003). Critics of the *aliran* approach like Liddle and Mujani (2000, 2007, and 2010) demonstrated that Indonesians' voting behavior is not caused by traditional party identification that arises from *aliran*, and instead by personalistic appeal of party leaders, which includes nostalgic sentiment, charisma, and personal popularity. The section on literature review will discuss the Indonesian parties further, and Table 1 in that section provides the results for the past three elections, as well as the characteristics that *aliran* and personalistic approaches focus on.

Although the debate between *aliran* and personalistic approaches has yet to be solved, scholars from both sides agree that vote mobilization in Indonesia leans toward the traditional valence approaches than policy or issue-based approaches. Most parties use religious appeal, charismatic leaders, patron-clientelism relationships, and any other ways within the reach of their opportunistic pragmatism strategies (Tomsa 2008). Although these traditional strategies continue to work, studies have shown that Indonesian voters have become more sophisticated and

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Rajagukguk, Indra Jaya. 2008. "Cara penghitungan kursi DPR pada Pemilu 2009 dan simulasi perolehan kursi DPR." *Blog Pendidikan Politik dan Pemilu 2009*, July 14. http://ijrsh.wordpress.com/2008/07/14/by-indra_jaya_rajagukgugk_sh-cara_penghitungan_kursi_dpr_dan_simulasi_sistem_uu_pemilu_2009/ (April 1, 2012).

increasingly demand good governance, economic growth, and improvements in human development. Political consciousness, as well as the evidence of "swing" voting, shows that people are paying more attention to policy issues (Mujani and Liddle 2010). This is where social media, a communication tool that encourages discussion of issues, comes in: I hypothesize that policy-oriented legislators are more likely to use social media than legislators with valence advantages.

Indonesia as a young democracy is a good case study because the elections in Indonesia since the democratization have been fair and competitive. Although there is no restriction of internet campaigns, we can still observe a high variation in their social media usage that can be explored. The electoral rules in Indonesia encourage both party-based and personal-based campaigns, while the high variation in district characteristics and voting behavior leads politicians to use different strategies, either valence-based or policy-based. These variations are the center of this thesis, as I would like to know if social media campaign is a party or personal mobilization tool, and if social media campaign complements valence-based strategy or policy-based strategy. The mixed motives of Indonesian politicians and voters, therefore, provide a good testing ground for my hypotheses that social media is a personal mobilization tool, and it complements policy-based strategy. As typologies matter in legislators electoral strategies, we can see that electoral variations correlate with social media usage in Indonesia.

1.1.1 Internet and Social Media in Indonesia

The internet technology has allowed the web to be an attractive campaign media, because of its low cost and the ability to provide "rapid…party communication…in a manner not possible via…print publications" (Adler, Gent, and Overweyer 1998; Hill 2003, 533). These benefits led

scholars to expect that politicians will take advantage of the incentives and start using websites to campaign. This turns out to be the case in the U.S.; from mid-1990s to present, the web has become a common electoral strategy, as 71% of the Senate and 68% of the House in 2003 have websites focusing on their campaigns (Adler et al 1998; Foot, Schneider, and Dougherty 2007). Many scholars expect the same will happen to Indonesia, since 'cyber spaces' and 'internet activism' were already present in Indonesia before the 1998 political reform (Lim 2006). Despite the prophecy, this was not the case in Indonesia as late as the mid-2000s. Scholars found no evidence for internet's significance in campaigning during the 1999 and 2004 elections. Even for a minority of politicians and political parties that owned websites, they were not interactive enough to be effective for campaigning. Instead, internet was used to aid vote tabulation purposes by the General Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or KPU) and to scrutinize the elections by the civil society (Hill 2003 and 2008; Hameed 2007).

Many would associate the failure of internet campaigning to take off in Indonesia with the fact that Indonesia is still a developing country, and therefore met with constraints in exploiting internet campaign. This is mainly because the claim that internet is economical is not universal, as it is measured using the modern West's standard, which is clearly very different from a developing country's standard. Until recently, internet access required a high fixed cost from purchasing a computer, a modem, and the service fees, which a majority of Indonesian population could not afford. Time is also another resource that needs to be taken account, because one needs to learn before being able to use the internet. Additionally for the politicians, they might need to hire people to handle various technical issues in their websites (Hill 2003).

Social media, along with the growth of cheap internet services and mobile communication device, mitigate the resource constraints that have hindered Indonesians from maximizing their

internet usage. Indonesia's internet penetration has grown tremendously from less than 1% of the population in 1999 to 45 million users or more than 5% of the current population[6]. Most of the users access internet through mobile phones (48%) and other handheld devices (13%), which is consistent with the mobile phone providers' efforts to give affordable internet services[7]. In fact, the combination of mobile communication and social media is so successful in Indonesia that the country is nicknamed "Twitter nation" and "Blackberry nation"[8]. This will allow politicians and constituents to use their social media accounts almost anywhere; profiles can be updated more often or even in real-time. Social media websites are also sophisticatedly designed to be simple and easy to use, so there is no need to allocate as much resources as running homepages. The developers strive to make social media websites as interactive as possible; using tools like status and newsfeed, it is easy to follow and respond to updates[9].With these improvements, social media perfectly fits between the needs and constraints of politicians and constituents alike for electoral campaigning.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature in electoral politics helps to offer explanations to the variation in social media usage between politicians. The common assumption in the literature is politicians desire to

[6] *Media Indonesia.* 2011. "Pengguna Internet di Indonesia Didominasi Anak Muda." 21 July. http://www.mediaindonesia.com/read/2011/07/21/243912/292/7/Pengguna-Internet-di-Indonesia-Didominasi-Anak-Muda (November 16, 2011)

[7] Asrianti, Tifa. 2011. "Cheap Smartphones Change RI Internet Behavior: Survey." *Jakarta Post*, 31 May. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/31/cheap-smartphones-change-ri-internet-behavior-survey.html (November 16, 2011)

[8] Safitri, Dewi. 2011. "Why is Indonesia So in Love with the Blackberry?" *BBC,* 15 June. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/direct/indonesia/9508138.stm (March 16, 2012)

[9] Webb, Jenn. 2011. "Social Media Design Should Start with Human Behavior." *O'Reilly Radar,* 18 March. http://radar.oreilly.com/2011/03/social-media-human-behavior.html (December 1, 2011)

seek reelection (Mayhew 1974). There are three approaches that I will discuss here: electoral system approach, party-centered approach, and district-centered approach.

2.1 Electoral System Approach

Literature that focuses on electoral systems tells us that electoral rules affect politicians' electoral strategies. Carey and Shugart (1995) assert a premise that electoral formulas, which include ballot control (secret vs. open), vote pooling (PR or majoritarian), types of votes, and district magnitudes, affect how individual politicians have incentives to build personal reputations that will distinguish them from their parties. Carey and Shugart rank the combinations of electoral rules by the value of personal reputation, and demonstrate that open-list PR system like the one in Indonesia, in comparison to closed-list PR, causes intra-party competition that leads candidates to personalize their campaigns. In this system, when the district magnitude increases, the competition intensifies because the number of candidates to be distinguished grows. As a result to the competition that happens in open-list PR, many scholars also demonstrated that the system encourages pork-barreling, clientelism, and corruption in many countries (Lancaster 1986; Ames 1995; Hiroi 2009). Carey and Shugart (1995) disagree by saying that politicians do not always have to engage in pork, as they can cultivate personal reputation through other measures, such as celebrity status and charisma.

The approach is helpful in identifying dominant strategies that politicians under a certain system would use, as well as explaining cross-country or cross-time variations in electoral strategies. The literature is relevant to this thesis as social media can be justified as a way for politicians to market and distinguish themselves, though it cannot explain the differences in strategies between politicians of the same electoral system, such as the DPR election in

Indonesia. The literature of Indonesian politics suggests that Indonesia is personalistic even before the adoption of open-list PR, since the most effective vote mobilization often involves charismatic appeals of party leaders and local political figures, as well as constituency services. This tells us that with the introduction of open-list PR, which leads to the increase of personal reputation, personalistic appeals might be insufficient for Indonesian politicians to differentiate among themselves. They will have to be enhance their personalistic appeal more (probably with clientelism), or their programmatic appeals, such as through policies or pork-barrel projects.

2.2 Party-Centered Approach

The literature that focuses on individual parties' roles in electoral politics suggests that the characteristics of individual parties affect candidates' electoral strategies. The level of party institutionalization is one way to characterize parties. The conceptual framework developed by Randall and Svåsand (2002) is particularly helpful as they focus on the circumstances in new democracies. They define party institutionalization as "the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behavior and of attitudes, or culture" (12). There are four aspects of institutionalization: systemness (the structural level of the interactions within the party), value infusion (the level of identification and commitment of party supporters and members that is not due to self-interests), decisional autonomy (the freedom to determine policies and strategies), and reification (the level of party's existence in the public).

Using the framework above, we can say two things about Indonesian parties: the level of party institutionalization in Indonesia varies, and the causes of institutionalization differs. Tomsa (2008) find that among all Indonesian parties that passed the DPR threshold, Golkar and PKS are the only well-institutionalized ones. Most Indonesian parties have low-level systemness due to

the lack of financial resources and the undemocratic internal party processes. This results to the low quality of candidates, disloyalty among the cadres, and factionalism (152-161). Decisional autonomy of the parties is also low, as the TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or the Indonesian National Armed Forces) has been able to exert its influence from time to time in local elections. Parties like PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or National Awakening Party) and PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or National Mandate Party) are also affiliated with the two largest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah respectively. Their affiliations have resulted PAN to be "perceived as little more than a political vehicle for ambitious Muhammadiyah people", and factionalization in PKB and NU (163-165). On reification, as of 2005, only Golkar and PDIP (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) have name recognition of above 90%. These two parties did well because they are the oldest and the strongest in terms of party mobilization. Demokrat (*Partai Demokrat* or Democratic Party), however, did exceptionally well as a new party, which shows that the party recognition is strongly tied to the recognition of the leaders (173-174).

In terms of value infusion, although there is a correlation between socio-cultural cleavages (*aliran*) and parties' bases, it is hard to determine whether these parties truly have high value infusion because they also rely strongly on personalistic appeal of the national leaders (King 2003; Mujani and Liddle 2010). *Aliran* or 'streams' is one of the earliest approaches in understanding politics in Indonesia, and it divides Indonesian voters into two main categories: *santri* (the devout Muslim) and *abangan* (the secular Muslim) (Geertz 1960). Scholars that use *aliran* approach believes that each party in Indonesia leans to one side of the spectrum or the other in terms of religious issues (King 2003). It is important to note, however, that all parties in

DPR are at least Islamic-friendly to enlarge their popular appeal (Baswedan 2004). On the other hand, Liddle and Mujani have consistently found in each election the significance of party leadership and the decline of such party identification in Indonesia (2000, 2007 and 2010).

Table 1 Post-Suharto election results and information on party characteristics

Political party[10]	1999 (%)	2004 (%)	2009 (%)	Charismatic leader	Islam/secular	Java/non-Java	Urban/rural	Class
Demokrat	-	7.5	20.9	Yes	Secular	Both	Urban	Middle class
Golkar	22.4	21.6	14.5	No	Both	Non-Java	Rural	Lower class
PDIP	33.7	18.5	14.0	Yes	Secular	Java	Rural	Lower class
PKS	1.4	7.3	7.9	No	New' Islam	Both	Urban	Middle class
PAN	7.12	6.4	6.0	Yes	Modernist Islam	Both	Urban	Middle class
PPP	10.7	8.2	5.3	No	Traditionalist and modernist Islam	Both	Rural	Lower class
PKB	12.6	10.6	4.9	Yes	Traditionalist Islam	Java	Rural	Lower class
Gerindra	-	-	4.5	Yes	Secular	Both	Rural	Lower class
Hanura	-	-	3.8	Yes	Secular	Both	-	-

Sources: KPU (2009); Sukma (2010: 56); Tomsa (2008 : 14 and 169); Liddle and Mujani (2010: 40)

Though the the party approach helps to differentiate Indonesian parties through the analysis of their characteristics, the weakness in this approach is that it cannot account for the different strategies that politicians of the same party might choose to adopt, given the electoral

[10] The political parties' names are in short forms. 'Demokrat' refers to *Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party); 'Golkar' refers to *Partai Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups Party); 'PDIP' refers to *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle); 'PKS' refers to *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party); PAN refers to *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party); PPP refers to *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party); PKB refers to *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party); Gerindra refers to *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya* (Greater Indonesia Movement Party); and Hanura refers to *Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat* (Peoples' Conscience Party).

competitiveness within the party. For this puzzle, we have to look at the district-focused approach.

2.3 District-Centered Approach

The third approach focuses on the differences in district characteristics as explanations to the variation in electoral strategies. Fenno (1978), who analyzes the representatives' views on their constituencies, explains the variation in legislators' campaigns in their districts, which he calls "home style". Home style is a combination of a legislator's allocation of resources, presentation of self, and explanation of their Washington activity. Legislators strategize their home style depending on their constraints; such as the career phase, the distance between the district and Washington, the family residency, the demographic of the district, the other legislators' strategies, the personal attributes, and the level of constituents' trusts. The district-centered approach is very useful in analyzing the Indonesian case, because of the high variety of district characteristics present in the country.

Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer (1998) adapt Fenno's method in understanding the variation in House members' use of official homepages, and their findings confirm that internet outlets are also parts of legislators' home style. They find that personal variables like age, district characteristics like socioeconomic status, as well as legislators' party memberships matter in the creation of homepages. While electoral uncertainty does not affect legislators' decisions to use homepages, it affects the websites' contents together with party affiliation. The results suggest "members who have chosen to go online and who are electorally insecure are more likely to use this outlet to increase the size of their reelection constituency" (592).

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN, HYPOTHESES, AND DATA

3.1 Research Question and Variables

This paper attempts to answers the following research question: what types of legislators use social media as part of their electoral strategy? To answer this question, I run a quantitative analysis using a dependent variable called Social Media Index (SMI), which is the number of social media websites that a legislator owns, which ranges from zero to four. For the purpose of this research, I only focus to four types of websites: Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and personal website. I consider blogs and personal websites as part of social media as it also provides interactive communication tools such as comment section, guestbook, forum, and chat box. The independent variables that I use come from three groups of explanations: legislator's attributes, district characteristics, and party. The list of variables that belong to each group is as followed:

- Legislator's attributes
    - *Age*: Legislator's biological age in 2012
    - *Education*: Legislator's level of education
    - *Islam*: Whether a legislator's stated religion is Islam
    - *Female*: Whether a legislator's stated gender is female
    - *Residency*: Whether a legislator lives within his/her electoral district
    - *Position*: Whether a legislator holds prominent position in DPR and/or party
    - *Top Rank*: Whether the number of individual votes gained by a legislator was first among the elected candidates in the district
    - *Bottom Rank*: Whether the number of individual votes gained by a legislator was last among the elected candidates in the district

    - *Pork Committee (A)*: Whether a legislator belongs to a DPR committee with high pork tendency
- District characteristics
    - *Distance*: The geographical distance between the electoral district to Jakarta in kilometer
    - *Education Attainment*: The percentage of district population that holds bachelor's degree
    - *Poverty*: The percentage of the district population living below poverty line
    - *Magnitude*: The number of seats allocated in a district
- Party
    - *Mandate*: Whether a legislator belongs to a party that has social media mandate to its cadres
    - *Party:* A legislator's party affiliation

After getting a clearer picture from the result of the regression analysis, I move on to qualitative analysis by studying Twitter activity in the month of February of two legislators from parties that enact social media mandate, one from Golkar and the other from PKS.

3.2 Hypotheses

I draw the hypotheses constructed in this research from the existing literature on electoral strategies, internet campaigning, and Indonesian politics. I hypothesize that personal attributes, district characteristics, and parties affect legislators' use of social media.

3.2.1 Hypothesis One: Legislator's attributes affect legislators' use of social media

According to scholars, personal conditions, like "a member's age, personal interests, ambitions, or ideology", shape his/her decision in employing electoral strategy (Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer 1998, 587). The relationships of some variables that correspond to legislator's attributes are not difficult to predict. The expected relationship between *Age* and social media usage is straightforward: younger legislators are more likely to use social media than older legislators. The same goes for *Education*: higher educated legislators will use social media more than their lower educated counterparts. The argument is that younger and higher educated individuals are more likely to be familiar with new technologies like social media. Another predicted relationship is that those who obtained the least individual votes in their districts back in 2009 elections (*Bottom Rank*), will be more likely to use more social media, because they are in expansionist phase. Drawing from Fenno's (1978) concept of home style, Adler, Gent and Overmeyer (1998) argue that unlike the protectionists, the expansionists "are in the process of building reliable reelection constituencies", therefore they are eager to "utilize all possible communication outlets" (587). Lastly, legislators who do not reside in their districts are more likely to use social media extensively as their access to their constituents is more limited than those who reside in their districts.

The other relationships, however, are more complex to predict. Religion and gender might affect legislator's social media usage; however, the direction of the relationship is unclear. One could argue that being the minorities in a legislative body dominated by male and Muslim, female and non-Muslim legislators have stronger incentives to publicize themselves, therefore resorting to more social media usage. Yet, the literature on electoral system tells us that competition between candidates who have similar attributes lead to efforts in distinguishing themselves, so it is plausible that the male and Muslim legislators are equally eager to use social

media as part of their electoral strategy (Carey and Shugart 1995). The relationship between position and social media usage is also hard to predict. Using the expansionist argument, legislators without prominent positions would have stronger incentive to take advantage of social media; however, the personalistic nature of Indonesian parties suggest that prominent office holders could be used by their parties as vote-getters, and therefore also more likely to use social media. Another relationship that is hard to gauge is between membership in DPR's pork committees and social media usage. Pork and social media campaign could be complementary of each other; for instance, a legislator might want to get exposure for his pork activities through social media as a credit-claiming device. It is equally possible, however, to think that pork and social media are substitutes of each other, and there are several reasons why one would think so. First, pork represents particularistic interests, so a legislator would prefer his pork activities to go unnoticed by non-benefitting actors. Second, delivering pork requires a lot of effort, thus legislators with limited resources will sacrifice social media campaigns. Third, altruistic legislators might have the motive to not get involved in pork, and focus on communication through social media instead.

2.2.2 Hypothesis Two: District characteristics affect legislators' use of social media

This hypothesis is drawn from the district-focused approach. I will look at "variations in the economic, social, or geographic characteristics of members' districts" as explanations to the variation in social media usage (Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer 1998, 587). I expect that legislators representing more developed districts, with higher education attainment and lower poverty level, will be more likely to use social media than those who represent less developed regions. The logic behind this is that politicians will have the incentive to spend their time online only if they believe that they have the audience to start with, which are more likely to come from more

developed areas, so that they will be assured that their efforts are worthwhile. Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer (1998) supports this hypothesis, as they find that U.S. representatives from “districts with higher socioeconomic status” are more likely to have websites than those from less affluent places (590-591). Another predicted relationship is that legislators from districts with larger magnitude are more likely to use social media to distinguish themselves from the competition (Carey and Shugart 1995).

The relationship between social media usage and district's distance from Jakarta is more ambiguous. Legislators elected from districts further from Jakarta could be more likely to use social media to reach constituents compared to those elected from districts closer to Jakarta, given the tough geographical conditions in Indonesia. However, regions further from the metropolitan Jakarta are more likely to be less developed, so using the logic of ready audience as legislator's incentive, it is possible that legislators from the "regions" are less likely to utilize social media than those coming from districts close to Jakarta.

2.2.3 Hypothesis Three: Parties affect legislators' use of social media

Since parties play a large role in shaping domestic politics in most countries, they are very likely to shape legislator's electoral strategies as well, especially in Indonesia, where independent candidates are not allowed to run for DPR seats. I would expect a few probable relationships in this hypothesis. First, looking at the nine parties in the current DPR, PKS and Golkar both passed social media mandate to its cadres, and they also happen to be the two parties in Indonesia that are known for their high organizational capacity (Tomsa 2008, Aspinall and Mietzner 2010). Therefore, we could expect that legislators from parties with social media mandate, Golkar and PKS, are more likely to use more social media than legislators from other parties. Second,

legislators from parties associated with "more educated, higher-income, white-collar middle class" support base like PAN, PKS and Demokrat would have more incentive to use social media than those who are not associated with such party constituency (Mujani and Liddle 2010). Last, legislators from relatively new parties like Hanura, Gerindra, and Demokrat, will utilize more social media than those from the more established parties, as they are more likely to be in their expansionist phase.

Table 3 Summary of hypotheses

Variable groups	Variables	Hypothesized relationship with social media index
Legislator's Attributes	Age	Negative
	Education	Positive
	Islam	-
	Female	-
	Residency	Negative
	Position	-
	Top Rank	Negative
	Bottom Rank	Positive
	Pork Committee	-
District Characteristics	Distance	-
	Education Attainment	Positive
	Poverty	Negative
	Magnitude	Positive
Party	Mandate	Positive
	Hanura	Positive
	Gerindra	Positive
	PKB	-
	PAN	Positive
	PKS	Positive
	Golkar	Positive
	Demokrat	Positive

3.3 Data and Methodology

This paper relies heavily on online resources to search for legislators' social media presence and the information for the independent variables. Information about Indonesian DPR legislators is also accessible to public on the internet via the DPR websites and various blogs that educate voters, though I often have to look up at different websites for the different variables. I collect original data with an individual legislator as the unit of analysis. After coding the data, I run quantitative analysis using SPSS. My sample size is 399 members of DPR (out of 560 members). Besides excluding the inactive and replacement members, I do not include legislators from PDIP and PPP due to time constraints. The exclusion, however, is done thoughtfully, as the sample size is large enough, and there is sufficient representation of secular parties (Demokrat, Golkar, Gerindra and Hanura), Muslim-based parties (PKS, PAN and PKB), coalition parties (as well as the opposition parties (Gerindra and Hanura).

3.3.1 Social Media

The social media websites I pay attention to are Facebook, Twitter, blog, and homepage. For each legislator, I research their internet presence in each of these websites using Google search engine, and document the following information: (1) whether they own the actual websites, (2) content, (3) date of latest access, (4) total number of posts, (5) network scope in terms of the number of followers and people followed in Twitter, or the number of friends and "likes" on Facebook. Then I create Social Media Index (SMI), which measures the number of social media websites each legislator has. The index ranges from zero (no social media website at all) to four (has all social media websites mentioned above), and it does not reflect the popularity or the activeness of the accounts. As demonstrated by Figure 1, only 40.6% of the DPR legislators in the sample do not own social media website. A majority (59.4%) of the legislators own social media website(s), with 30.33% of them having just one website. The most

popular social media website among the four is Facebook, with 172 users in my DPR sample, followed by Twitter, blog, and personal websites.



Figure 1 Frequency of Social Media Index (SMI) values in the sample

Table 4. Popularity of Different Social Media Websites in DPR

Type of Social Media Website	Number of DPR Users
Website	74
Blog	64
Twitter	106
Facebook	172

Note: Total of 399 DPR legislators in my dataset.

3.3.2 Legislator's Attributes and Party

For information on legislator's attributes, I obtained most of the information from *Blog Pendidikan Politik dan Pemilu 2009* (Political and 2009 Elections Education Blog) maintained by Indra Jaya Rajagukguk[11], a lawyer and political activist who educates the public by compiling

[11] Rajagukguk, Indra Jaya. 2009. "Peranan Blog Dalam Kancah Politik Indonesia." *Blog Pendidikan Politik dan Pemilu 2009*, March 25. http://ijrsh.wordpress.com/ (April 1, 2012).

electoral information. I verified and added missing information from *Blog Pendidikan Politik dan Pemilu 2009* with the data from KPU's website[12] (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or General Election Commission) and MPR's website[13] (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or People's Consultative Assembly—the bicameral legislative branch in Indonesia). The information I gained from those websites are legislator's name, MPR code, year of birth, gender, religion, education level, address, party membership, DPR committee membership, and number of votes. I obtained information on the rankings of legislators' individual votes in the district from Adam Carr, a scholar and political activist, in his website Psephos – Adam Carr's Election Archive[14]. Information for party or DPR position was collected more sporadically, but they are mostly from DPR's website[15].

Most of the coding I did was more or less straightforward. I created the variable *Age* by subtracting legislator's year of birth from 2012; the data shows that the youngest legislator is 28 years old, while the oldest is 74 years old. For *Education*, which is legislator's education level, it was coded following Indonesian education degrees: 0 represents high school diploma, 1 represents D3 (associate's degree) or S1 (bachelor's degree), 2 represents S2 (master's degree), 3 represents S3 (doctoral degree). The dummy variable *Islam* used coding formula of 0 for non-Islam, and 1 for Islam; the dummy variable *Female* was also coded similarly (0 for male, 1 for female). For the ranking of legislators' individual votes, I divided that into two dummy variables, *Top Rank* and *Bottom Rank*. In *Top Rank*, legislators who received highest individual votes in their districts was coded as 1, while legislators who received lowest individual votes among the elected candidates in their districts was coded 1 for *Bottom Rank*. The rest of elected legislators

[12] Komisi Pemilihan Umum. 2012. www.kpu.go.id (April 1, 2012).
[13] Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 2012. www.mpr.go.id (April 1, 2012).
[14] Adam Carr. "Indonesia 2009 Legislative Election: Voting by Electoral District." *Psephos – Adam Carr's Election Archive*. http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/indonesia/index2009.shtml (April 1, 2012)
[15] Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 2012. www.dpr.go.id (April 1,2012).

who are ranked between first and last were coded as 0 in both measures. The ranking of legislators' individual votes per district was obtained from Psephos, Adam Carr's website.

The rest of the variables in this group used criteria that are more complex. The values for variable *Residency* was made using the information on legislators' home addresses stated in KPU and MPR websites. The coding formula was 0 indicates that legislator lives outside the province of his/her electoral district, and 1 indicates that the legislator lives within the province of his/her electoral district. The reason why I choose province as the standard of residency is that the center of administration and population is often in provincial capitals, that might not be in the geographical scope of the electoral district, but close enough to the constituents. For *Position*, I only consider prominent positions such as DPR chairperson and vice chairpersons, committee leaders and deputies, faction leaders, party's chairperson and secretary general. Individuals holding these positions are coded as 1, while those who are coded 0.

Table 5 DPR Committees and Pork Categorization

Category	Commission	Areas of Responsibility
Pork	IV	Agriculture, plantations, maritime affairs, fisheries and food
	V	Transport, telecommunications, public works, public housing, village development and disadvantaged areas
Gray area	VI	Trade, industry, investment, cooperatives, small and medium businesses and state-owned companies
	VII	Energy, natural mineral resources, research and technology, the environment
	X	Education, youth affairs, sports, tourism, art and culture
Not pork	I	Defense, foreign affairs and information
	II	Domestic governance, regional autonomy, state apparatus and agrarian affairs
	III	Legal affairs and laws, human rights and security
	VIII	Religion, social affairs, the empowerment of women
	IX	Demographic affairs, health, manpower and transmigration
	XI	Finances, national development planning, banking and non-bank financial institutions

3.3.3 District Characteristics

The variable *Distance* was gotten by measuring the geographical distance between Jakarta and the biggest city or town in the electoral district, using straight-line distance based on latitudes and longitudes; therefore it does not reflect the actual travel distance[16]. The variables *Education Attainment* and *Poverty* were collected from *Badan Pusat Statistik*[17] (Indonesia's Central Agency on Statistics). *Education Attainment* is the percentage of the population per province that has bachelor's degree in 2004, while *Poverty* shows the percentage of the population per province that lives under poverty line in 2011. *Magnitude* is the district magnitude or the number of seats allocated in each electoral districts; the information was obtain from Psephos, Adam Carr's website.

3.3.4 Data Limitations and Rooms for Improvement

First, although I have the information on the scope of legislators' social media network, date of access, and the number of posts in my sample, I have not been able to encompass them into my current Social Media Index. Being able to include such information would improve the direction of this research and findings greatly. Although it is certainly possible, it is not realistic considering the resource limitation for this project. Second, the information available online about the legislators may not be the most accurate, despite my efforts to crosscheck all of them. For example, a legislator might state that he lives within his electoral district, but actually spends most of his time in Jakarta. Other information that could be inaccurate are position and committee's membership, because of the Indonesian political norm of rotating legislators to different positions and committees. Third, though the variables on individual votes' rankings

[16] Globe Feed. 2012 "Indonesia Distance Calculator."*Globe Feed.* http://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/Indonesia_Distance_Calculator.asp (April 1, 2012)
[17] Badan Pusat Statistik. 2012. www.bps.go.id (April 1,2012)

attempt to reflect the electoral margin, it would give a more complete picture if the rankings of all candidates are available. Last, there is no standard that can be used to categorize the DPR committees' level of pork activities yet, therefore, the criteria used for the variable *Pork Committee (A)* was based on my knowledge of how DPR Committees work.

Table 6 Summary of variables' coding

Variables	Description
Social Media Index (SMI)	The number of social media websites a legislator owns (0 = owns none, 4 = owns all)
Age	Legislator's age in 2012
Education	Legislator's level of education (0 = high school, 1 = diploma or bachelor's degree, 2 = master's degree, 3 = Ph.D)
Islam	Legislator's Islam identification (1 = Islam, 0 = non-Islam)
Female	Legislator's gender (0 = male, 1 = female)
Residency	Legislator's residency (0 = reside outside electoral district, 1 = reside within electoral district)
Position	Legislator's position in DPR and/or party (0 = holds no prominent position, 1 = holds prominent position)
Top Rank	Whether a legislator came out as first among the elected candidates in the electoral district (0 = did not come out as first, 1 = came out as first)
Bottom Rank	Whether a legislator came out as last among the elected candidates in the electoral district (0 = did not come out as last, 1 = came out as last)
Pork Committee (A)	Legislator's membership in DPR committees that have strong tendency for pork policies (0 = not a member in pork committee, 1 = member of pork committee)
Distance	The distance between the electoral district to Jakarta in kilometer
Education Attainment	The percentage of the population that owns bachelor's degree according to BPS-Statistics Indonesia 2004
Poverty	The percentage of the population living below poverty level according to from BPS-Statistics Indonesia 2010
Magnitude	The number of seats in a district according to Psephos by Adam Carr
Mandate	Whether a legislator belongs to a party that has social media mandate to its cadres (0 = no social media mandate, 1 = has social media mandate)
Hanura	Hanura party membership (0 = not member, 1 = member)
Gerindra	Gerindra party membership (0 = not member, 1 = member)
PKB	PKB party membership (0 = not member, 1 = member)
PAN	PAN party membership[(0 = not member, 1 = member)
PKS	PKS party membership (0 = not member, 1 = member)
Golkar	Golkar party membership (0 = not member, 1 = member)
Demokrat	Demokrat party membership (0 = not member, 1 = member)

CHAPTER FOUR: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses

Table 7 Descriptive Statistics

Categories	Variables	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent Variable	Social Media Index (SMI)	399	1.03	1.08	0	4.00
Social Media Websites	Website	399	0.19	0.39	0	1.00
	Blog	399	0.16	0.37	0	1.00
	Twitter	399	0.27	0.44	0	1.00
	Facebook	399	0.43	0.5	0	1.00
Legislator's Attributes	Age	398	50.82	9.49	28.00	74.00
	Education	396	1.41	0.71	0	3.00
	Islam	399	0.87	0.33	0	1.00
	Female	399	0.18	0.38	0	1.00
	Residency	399	0.42	0.49	0	1.00
	Pork A	396	0.46	0.5	0	1.00
Seat's Safety	Position	399	0.11	0.31	0	1.00
	Top Rank	399	0.13	0.33	0	1.00
	Bottom Rank	399	0.12	0.33	0	1.00
District's Characteristics	Distance	399	812.73	760.68	0	3776.00
	Education Attainment	390	1.94	0.88	0.84	5.22
	Poverty	399	13.02	5.42	3.75	31.98
	Magnitude	399	7.74	1.8	3.00	10.00
Party	Mandate	399	0.38	0.49	0	1.00
	Hanura	399	0.04	0.2	0	1.00
	Gerindra	399	0.07	0.25	0	1.00
	PKB	399	0.07	0.25	0	1.00
	PAN	399	0.11	0.31	0	1.00
	PKS	399	0.13	0.33	0	1.00
	Golkar	399	0.25	0.44	0	1.00
	Demokrat	399	0.34	0.48	0	1.00

4.1.1 Legislator's Attributes and Social Media Usage

To get a picture of the relationship between variables that account for legislator's attributes and Social Media Index, which represents social media usage, I conduct bivariate analysis with the help of bar graphs. As seen in Figure 2, the relationship between age groups and mean of Social Media Index is surprisingly not that straightforward. If the hypothesis is correct, I expect to see the mean of Social Media Index to decline as the age group increases; however, the distribution of Social Media Index means is similar to a bell curve shape. The mean distribution increases from 0.33 in the age group of 20-29, peaks at 1.40 in the age group of 40-49, and then drops to 0.20 in the age group of 70-79. Figure 3 shows the relationship between legislator's level of education and social media usage and the relationship is just as expected by the hypothesis. The mean of Social Media Index and education level have positive relationship, although the mean difference decreases as the education level goes up. Figure 4 suggests that Islam legislators use more social media than non-Islam legislators, while Figure 5 shows no difference in Social Media Index between male and female legislators. As seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7, legislators who do not live within their districts and those who are not in pork committees also seem to use more social media than their counterparts. Figure 8 suggests that those who hold prominent positions in DPR and party are more likely to use social media than those who do not have such positions. Legislators who are ranked first in terms of individual votes in their districts are more likely to use social media than those who are not, as seen in Figure 9. Those whose individual votes are ranked last among the elected candidates in their districts, on the other hand, are less likely to use social media, as seen in Figure 10.



Figure 2 Social Media Index Comparison for Different Age Groups



Figure 3 Social Media Index Comparison for Different Levels of Education



Figure 4 Social Media Index Comparison for Islam and Non-Islam Legislators



Figure 5 Social Media Index Comparison for Male and Female Legislators



Figure 6 Social Media Index Comparison between Legislators Residing Outside and Inside of the District



Figure 7 Social Media Index Comparison between Legislators in Non-Pork and Pork Committe



Figure 8 Social Media Index Comparison Between Non-Position Holders and Position Holders



Figure 9 Social Media Index Comparison between Legislators with Highest Individual Votes and Those Without



Figure 10 Social Media Index Comparison Between Legislators with Lowest Individual Votes Among Elected Candidates and Those Without

4.1.2 District's Characteristics and Social Media Usage

To figure out the relationship between district's characteristics and social media usage, I use the bar graphs and scatter plots with best-fit line to see the correlation between the variables. Figure 11 shows that the relationship between distance and politcians' social media usage is

negative, as the further the district, the lower the mean for Social Media Index. The relationship between district magnitude and social media usage is less straightforward, as the Social Media Index means fluctuate as the district magnitude increases; however Figure 12 does suggest that the relationship could be positive. Figure 13 and Figure 14 show that district's education attainment is positively correlated with social media usage, while poverty level is negatively correlated with social media usage. The r-square value, however, is very low because of the noises that are present in the data.



Figure 11 Social Media Index Comparison for Different Distance Groups



Figure 12 Social Media Index Comparison for Different Magnitudes



Figure 13 Correlations between Education Attainment and Social Media Index



Figure 14 Correlations between Poverty and Social Media Index

4.1.3 Parties and Social Media Usage

Figure 15 shows the difference in means of Social Media Index between legislators with social media mandate from their parties and those without such mandate. Although those with social media mandate have higher social media usage, I expect the difference in means to be larger. When broken down into parties, the top two parties with highest social media usage are PKS and PKB. PKS leads with Social Media Index mean of 1.72, followed by PKB that has Social Media Index mean of 1.27, while Golkar, despite mandating its cadres to utilize social media, is in the third rank with Social Media Index mean of 1.02. Relatively new parties in the administration, Demokrat, Gerindra, and Hanura, are in the bottom three of social media usage.



Figure 15 Social Media Index Comparison for Non-Mandated and Mandated Legislators



Figure 16 Social Media Index Comparison for Parties in Dataset

4.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis

I run five models of multivariate linear regressions. Model 1 is a multivariate regression with all independent variables except for variables under the party category. Model 2 is a multivariate regression with all independent variables except for *Mandate*, which I consciously exclude, and Demokrat, which is chosen by SPSS as the base. Model 3 is a multivariate

regression similar to Model 1, except that it includes the variable *Mandate*. Model 4 is just like Model 1, but it also includes the variable *Golkar*, while Model 5 is Model 1 plus the variable *Demokrat*. From the five regression models, we are able to obtain information about the direction of the impact that each variable has when holding all other factors constant. From legislator's attributes and district characteristics categories, an increase in value for *Age*, *Female*, *Residency*, *Pork Committee*, *Bottom Rank*, and *Poverty* will lead to a decrease in the value of Social Media Index. On the other hand, an increase in value for education, Islam, position, top rank, distance, education attainment, and magnitude will lead to a positive impact in Social Media Index.

In these five models, however, only variables *Age*, *Education*, *Residency*, and *Education Attainment* are consistently significant. In Model 2, the model with the variables held constant, a 10-year increase in *Age* leads to a predicted 0.16 decrease in Social Media Index at 99% confidence level; which means an increase of 62.5 year of age is needed to get a value decrease of 1 in Social Media Index. For *Education*, a legislator is predicted to have a 0.188 increase in Social Media Index for each level of education increase at 95% confidence level. Comparing a legislator that is a high school graduate (*Education* = 0) and those who hold a PhD (*Education* = 4) then, the PhD holder should have 0.752 higher Social Media Index. These two findings prove the first hypothesis that personal attributes affect politicians' social media usage to an extent, as well as confirming Fenno's (1978) and Adler, Getler and Overmeyer's (1998) findings.

Holding all other variables constant, a legislator who lives within his/her electoral district (*Residency* = 1) is predicted to have a 0.273 lower Social Media Index value compared to those who reside outside the district, which shows that legislators residing outside their districts are more likely to use social media than those residing within their districts. This proves the hypothesis that legislators who do not reside in their electoral districts might resort to social

media as a form of communication with their constituents. Additionally, legislators who reside in their electoral districts have higher personal access to their constituents, and therefore more likely to utilize valence advantages, such as pork, clientelism, and personal charisma. The finding that *Residency* and Social Media Index have negative relationship, therefore, suggests that valence-based strategies do not go along with social media campaigns.

Education attainment is the only significant variable among district characteristics. A 10-percentage point increase in the fraction of the population that holds bachelor's degree will increase Social Media Index by 1.12 points. The result, however, is unrealistic as the highest value of district's education attainment in Indonesia by 2004 is 5.22 (See Table 7 for the descriptive statistics). The empirical finding means that legislators who represent districts with higher educated population are more likely to use social media as part of their electoral strategies. This proves Fenno's (1978) and Adler, Getler and Overmeyer's (1998) findings that district characteristics, such as socioeconomic differences, affect legislators' electoral strategies or home style.

For the variables in party category, *Mandate*, *PKS*, and *Demokrat* are statistically significant. Model 3 demonstrates that legislators who received social media mandate are 34% more likely to have one more social media in average, compared to those without social media mandate. Using Model 2, which controls other variables constant and uses *Demokrat* as the base criteria, a PKS member is predicted to have a Social Media Index that is 0.707 higher than a Demokrat member on average. This means that when comparing a Demokrat legislator and a PKS legislator who have same personal attributes and belong to the same district, the PKS legislator is 71% more likely to own one more social media than the Demokrat legislator. On the

other hand, holding everything else constant, being a Demokrat reduces the predicted Social Media Index by 0.246.

The statistical significance of *Mandate* and the negative direction from the variable *Demokrat* highlight the differences between institutionalized and non-institutionalized parties in Indonesia. As noted earlier in Chapter One and Chapter Two, Golkar and PKS, the two well-institutionalized parties in Indonesia, are the only parties to pass the social media mandate to their cadres (Tomsa 2008, Aspinall and Mietzner 2010). The social media mandate is proven essential in our understanding of legislators' usage of social media as mandated legislators do follow their party instructions. *PKS*, however, is the only variable that is significant out of the two parties with social media mandate. This suggests that although they do follow party's mandate, PKS legislators follow the instruction much more closely than Golkar legislators do. The difference in the level of compliance to party strategies between two well-institutionalized parties, therefore, shows that looking only at the levels of institutionalization is insufficient to explain the difference in legislators' behavior. Further examination on each aspect of party institutionalization, shows that value infusion within Golkar is weaker, as cadres mostly joined the party for opportunistic and pragmatist reasons (Tomsa 2008, 114-120). PKS, on the contrary, has members who joined the party because they are committed to the party's ideology and policy based on Islam (168). The difference in value infusion suggests that Golkar members are not as obedient as PKS members are because the incentives to be committed to the party are different. Golkar also tend to rely more on valence-based strategies like patronage, celebrity status, loyalties to traditional aristocrats, while PKS focuses on policy-based strategies such as opposition to corruption (114-20; 168). The difference in the social media usage between PKS

and Golkar legislators, therefore, could be due to the compatibility of social media and legislators' electoral strategy of choice.

Table 8 Various Multivariate Regression Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Legislator's Attributes					
Age	-0.019	-0.016	-0.020	-0.019	-0.018
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***
Education	0.175	0.188	0.179	0.176	1.183
	(0.076)**	(0.076)**	(0.076)**	(0.076)**	(0.076)**
Islam	0.180	0.066	0.137	0.179	0.130
	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.172)
Female	-0.116	-0.003	-0.061	-0.117	0.071
	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Residency	-0.299	-0.273	-0.266	-0.296	0.292
	(0.109)***	(0.108)**	(0.108)**	(0.109)***	(0.108)***
Pork Committee (A)	-0.171	-0.134	-0.169	-0.174	-0.158
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Seat's Safety					
Position	0.089	0.151	0.114	0.089	0.092
	(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.176)
Top rank	0.048	0.061	0.057	0.049	0.088
	(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.164)
Bottom rank	-0.113	-0.006	-0.009	-0.098	0.111
	(0.167)	(0.172)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.166)
District Characteristics					
Distance	2.12E-05	3.40E-05	1.01E-05	1.69E-05	1.11E-05
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education attainment	0.117	0.112	0.126	0.120	0.119
	(0.068)*	(0.097)*	(0.067)*	(0.068)*	(0.068)*
Poverty	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Magnitude	0.014	0.024	0.021	0.015	0.016
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Party					
Mandate			0.337		
			(0.112)***		
Hanura		-0.091			

		(0.271)			
Gerindra		-0.024			
		(0.229)			
PKB		0.335			
		(0.229)			
PAN		0.101			
		(0.187)			
PKS		0.707			
		(0.180)***			
Golkar		0.219		0.070	
		(0.139)		(0.127)	
Demokrat					-0.246
					(0.114)**
Constant	1.514	1.125	1.319	1.501	1.554
	(0.508)***	(0.030)**	(0.507)***	(0.509)***	(0.506)***
Observation	382	382	382	382	382
R-square	0.082	0.126	0.322	0.083	0.093
	(1.029)		(1.018)		
Adjusted R-square	0.049	0.080	0.07	0.048	0.059
	(1.029)		(1.018)		

As party seems to be an important factor in social media usage by legislators, I also run regression to if each factor affects parties differently (See Table 9). In my comparison, I picked two secular parties, Demokrat and Golkar, and two Islamic-based parties, PKS and PAN. Among the Democrats, the only factor that is statistically significant is *Age*, where a 43.5-year increase in age leads to a predicted Social Media Index decrease of one. For legislators from Golkar, the statistically significant factor is *Education*. A three-level increase of *Education* will lead to a predicted Social Media Index to increase of 1.173; which means that, *ceteris paribus*, a legislator with Master's degree will have one more social media website when compared to a legislator, who is a high school graduate. Between the legislators from PKS, *Education* is also a statistically significant factor, and the impact of *Education* on PKS members is bigger than the impact on Golkar members. The coefficient for education between PKS members is 0.486, which means

that a two-level increase of education is enough to create a one-value increase of Social Media Index, compared to three-level for Golkar. Another variable that is statistically significant for PKS legislators is *Magnitude*. Holding all other variables constant, increasing the district magnitude by four seats will lead to a prediction that PKS legislators' Social Media Index increases by one point. Unlike the other parties in comparison, PAN does not have any statistically significant factors. Another notable observation is that there are less statistically significant variables and lower confidence level in the second type of regression. This is considered normal because the samples obtained from individual parties are much lower than the DPR sample of 399 members.

Table 9 Multivariate Regression for Different Parties

	Demokrat	**Golkar**	**PKS**	**PAN**
Legislator's Attributes				
Age	-0.023	-0.007	0.013	-0.023
	(0.009)**	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Education	0.083	0.391	0.486	0.371
	(0.130)	(0.181)**	(0.226)**	(0.328)
Islam	0.078	0.346		-0.196
	(0.244)	(0.384)		(0.883)
Female	-0.053	-0.200	-0.426	-0.700
	(0.233)	(0.318)	(1.092)	(0.616)
Residency	-0.169	-0.277	-0.495	-0.590
	(0.369)	(0.257)	(0.371)	(0.419)
Pork Committee (A)	-0.278	-0.146	-0.154	-0.008
	(0.189)	(0.239)	(0.352)	(0.476)
Seat's Safety				
Position	-0.014	0.225	0.558	0.081
	(0.311)	(0.381)	(0.618)	(0.585)
Top rank	-0.087	0.138	0.219	1.201
	(0.237)	(0.347)	(0.516)	(0.983)
Bottom rank	-0.230	0.167	0.159	0.586
	(0.285)	(0.859)	(0.677)	(0.644)
District Characteristics				
Distance	6.84E-05	0.000	0.000	0.000

	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education Attainment	0.102	0.115	0.156	0.143
	(0.111)	(0.177)	(0.159)	(0.255)
Poverty	0.000	-0.025	-0.032	0.055
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Magnitude	0.027	0.017	0.236	-0.018
	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.106)**	(0.155)
Constant	1.659	0.576	-1.142	1.012
	(0.898)*	(1.120)	(1.883)	(2.020)
Observation	130	95	47	40
R-square	0.090	0.120	0.373	0.351
	(0.970)	(1.120)	(0.993)	(1.040)
Adjusted R-square	-0.011	-0.020	0.158	0.038
	(0.970)	(1.120)	(0.993)	(1.040)

CHAPTER FIVE: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The most interesting finding in this thesis thus far is the variation in legislators' behaviors in Golkar and PKS, despite the similarities in two parties, such as the high level of party institutionalization and the presence of social media mandates. The mean Social Media Index for Golkar is 1.02, while PKS's Social Media Index mean is 1.72 (See Figure 16). The difference in legislators' behaviors between these two parties is even more pronounced in the simple linear regression with control variables: Model 2 in Table 8 shows that the PKS is statistically significant in 99% confidence level, while Golkar is not statistically significant at all. The quantitative analysis suggests that legislators in PKS follow the social mandate much more closely compared to those from Golkar. This finding also supports Tomsa's (2008) argument that value infusion and members' incentives in joining the party are related. According to him, a catch-all party lacking any genuine political values like Golkar might survive in a democratic political arena for a short term, but not in the long term as they lack "the persuasiveness and long-term stability of a genuine political values" (119). Other than acting as a patronage-dispensing vehicle, members have very little attachment to Golkar as a party, which resulted to their low level of compliance to party's strategies (115).

5.1 Case Studies

Social Media Index, however, only shows the number of social media websites that each legislator has; it could tell us the factors that cause legislators to use social media websites in their electoral strategies, but not how they use the social media. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the variation in legislators' social media contents. As the only two parties that have launched social media mandate—Golkar and PKS—have different results when analyzed

quantitatively, I am interested in looking at legislators who utilize social media to see if they are using it differently too. Twitter is the social media of choice in this case study as it has the simplest features among social media websites, and very few legislators activate the privacy function, unlike Facebook, which aid the content analysis. The two legislators I picked for my case study represent Golkar and PKS respectively. Ideally, I would like to use a pair of Golkar and PKS legislators from the same district that have similar level of Twitter activeness in the month of February. Although I found a Twitter-active pair of Golkar and PKS legislators, the activity levels between them are so different (one of the legislators has a very low Twitter activity, while the other one has a very high Twitter activity) that I decided to not use the pair as my case study, due to fear of inaccurate content analysis. Instead, I chose Golkar and PKS legislators with similar level of Twitter activeness from different electoral districts that have comparable level of *Education Attainmen* of voters. I want to control *Education Attainment* as it is the only dependent variable in district characteristics that is statistically significant in the regression (See Table 8).

Legislators in the case study are Harry Azhar Azis (Mr. Azis)[18] and Mahfudz Siddiq (Mr. Siddiq)[19]. Mr. Azis is a Golkar legislator representing Kepulauan Riau (the split-off of Riau Province), while Mr. Siddiq is a PKS legislator representing Jawa Barat VIII (Cirebon municipality, Cirebon regency, and Indramayu regency). They both hold prominent positions in the DPR; Mr. Azis is the deputy chairman of Commission XI which oversees finance, while Mr. Siddiq is the chairman of Commission I which oversees foreign policy. Their Twitter activities can be categorized as very high, with Mr. Azis leading with 256 tweets in February, while Mr, Siddiq has 85 tweets, which is still considered very high compared to most DPR legislators.

[18] Azis, Harry Azhar. 2012. "@harryazharazis" February. https://twitter.com/#!/harryazharazis (April 2, 2012).
[19] Siddiq, Mahfudz. 2012. "@MahfudzSiddiq" February. https://twitter.com/#!/mahfudzsiddiq (April 2, 2012).

Most of their tweets are in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language of Indonesia, though they occasionally tweet in other languages, such as English for Mr. Azis, and various dialects spoken in Java for Mr. Siddiq.

Table 10 Summary of information for legislators in case study

	Dr. H. Harry Azhar Azis	**Drs. Mahfudz Siddiq**
Social Media Index	4	4
Party	Golkar	PKS
District	Kepulauan Riau	Jawa Barat VIII
Education attainment (%)	8.64	10.38
Commission	XI - Finances, national development planning, banking and non-bank financial institutions	I - Defense, foreign affairs and information
Position	Deputy chairman of Commission XI	Chairman of Commission I
Gender	Male	Male
Total number of Tweets in February	256	85
Level of activity in February	Very active	Very active
Language used in Twitter beside Bahasa Indonesia	English	Dialects

Table 11 shows the types of tweets and the percentages for each legislator. As we can see in Table 11 and Figure 17, the Twitter accounts were dominated by casual conversation with regular citizens (38% for Mr. Azis, and 44% for Mr. Siddiq), such as morning greetings, and responses to simple questions from curious followers. Commission related tweets followed closely; 38% of Mr. Azis's tweets in February are about the finance sector, Indonesian banks, and various issues covered in Commission XI, while 24% of Mr. Siddiq's tweets are on defense

and foreign policy, which are the area of responsibilities of Commission I. Other tweets on legislative activities outside their commissions are pretty low; Mr. Azis only devoted 4% of his tweets, while it is 1% for Mr. Siddiq. Topics on local government and foreign travel are also not that prominent; Mr. Azis's tweets consist of 1% for each topic, while Mr. Siddiq did not talk about them at all. More in depth comparison between these two legislators will be done in terms of the functions of social media as an electoral strategy: vote mobilization and policy communication.

Table 11 Summary of Twitter contents

Topic	Keywords or Examples	Golkar Dr. H. Harry Azhar Azis (%)	PKS Drs. Mahfudz Siddiq (%)
Casual conversation	"Good morning", "I am fine, Alhamdulillah", "The issue will be discussed again on Monday"	38	44
Committee related	"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to take steps in order to evacuate Indonesians in Syria", "Lower interest rates!"	34	24
Party	Golkar, PKS, *fraksi* (caucus)	2	9
Religious	"The prophet's diet: do not mix carbohydrate with protein, one type of protein is enough, do not drink a lot of water after a meal #prophetstreatment	0	6
District	"Cirebon is flooded again"; "According to population, the seats for Kepulauan Riau should be four instead of three"	4	4
Legislative	DPR, RUU (*Rancangan Undang-Undang* or draft bill)	4	1
Local government	"Where is Golkar's coalition for Tanjung Pinang's mayor election?"	1	0
Foreign travel	"Together with a member of Timor Leste's parliament for a UNISDR even in Incheon, Korea. I am presenting about budget in disaster"	1	0
Fuel subsidies	BBM, *subsidi* (subsidies)	13	2
Labor	*Buruh* (labor), *upah* (wage)	0	5
Activist group	Cipayung Group, HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* or Islamic Students Association)	4	0
Media politics	ILC (Indonesian Lawyers' Club), television, theatrical politics	0	6
Others	-	1	0
Total		100	100



Figure 17 Content comparisons in case study

5.1.1 Policy Communication

The nature of social media, especially Twitter, is such that they encourage conversations among users; therefore as an electoral strategy tool, it promotes the discussion of policies and issues. One explanation to why this is the case is the difficulty to demonstrate valence-based campaign strategies, such as personalistic appeal, pork activities, and patron-client relationship on a text-based website like Twitter. This is evident in the case study by how little these legislators talk about money politics or personal information; instead, they raised policy subjects of local and national importance, shared their opinions, and defended their policy stances.

One of the highly debated topics in Indonesian politics is the issue of fuel subsidies, and both legislators in the case study did not shy away from the discussion. Following the raise in world's oil price, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono proposed to increase the price of the government-subsidized fuel in order to ease the state budget. This proposal triggered harsh

reactions from the public; students-organized demonstrations that sometimes turn ugly paralyzed the big cities for days. The middle class is divided in their opinion: those who are aware about the inefficiency of the subsidies support the fuel hike, while those who fear the increase commodity prices oppose it. The DPR legislators are equally divided as well; the opposition parties (PDIP, Gerindra, and Hanura) along with PKS are against the price increase, while the rest of the coalition parties (Demokrat, Golkar, PAN, PKB, and PPP) support the President's proposal.[20]

Mr. Azis, who is from Golkar, is more vocal about this issue, devoting 13% of his tweets to voice his support for the government's proposal to reduce fuel subsidies. Besides applauding President SBY's "courage" in announcing the price increase, he also argued that the current subsidies benefit the non-targeted segment of the population more, such as affluent people who drive luxury cars. In response to the public's critiques through Twitter on how the government decision will cost the majority of population, Mr. Azis assured that the increase in the price have to be accompanied by compensation program and the calculation of predicted poverty level. Mr. Siddiq of PKS, on the other hand, did not talk about the fuel subsidies as much as Mr. Azis; only 2% of his tweets in February was on that topic. He still showed concerns on the systematic impact on the public if the fuel price increased, though he acknowledged that the reduction of subsidies would alleviate some of the budgeting problems that the government is dealing with. He also criticized the Minister of Manpower and Transportation's statement for accusing that some officials' decisions to increase the minimum wage were politically driven. The legislators'

[20] Agustiyanti, Rizky Amelia, Arientha Primanita and Ezra Sihite. 2012. "Price of Fuel in Indonesia May Still Be Going Up." *Jakarta Globe*, 2 April. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/price-of-fuel-in-indonesia-may-still-be-going-up/508609 (April 2, 2012)

Twitter activities, therefore, communicate their policy stances to readers: Mr. Azis is anti-populism, while Mr. Siddiq is pro-populism.

Their policy discussions, however, were geared more towards national issues compared to local; only 4% of their tweets mentioned district interests**.** Both of them rarely talked about local issues, such as events happening in the districts, or the policy aspirations of their district constituencies. When they did cover issues related to the districts, Mr. Azis focused on regional autonomy demands for larger revenue-sharing from the central government, the problematization of the geographical scope of his district, and the issue of misproportion of seats allocation, while Mr. Siddiq focused on the natural disaster that struck his district. The lack of discussion about the district supports the hypothesis that pork and social media are incompatible with each other, while social media supports policy activities.

5.1.2 Vote Mobilization

Looking at the contents' breakdown, it is surprising to see how little these two legislators talk about their parties; only 2% of Mr. Azis's tweets mentioned Golkar, and only 9% of Mr. Siddiq's tweets mentioned PKS. This observation, along with the comparison of how often commission related issues are brought up on Twitter, conforms to the finding that the DPR commissions are more powerful than the party in terms of legislative processes (Sherlock 2010), hence the emphasis put by the legislators even on Twitter. It also answers one of the questions regarding vote mobilization: is social media a tool to mobilize votes for the party or personal? The case study suggests that social media is a tool for legislators to mobilize mainly personal vote, though parties still have influence in their strategies to some extent; which is in line with

the literature on electoral system of how politicians differentiate themselves in open-list proportional representation system due to intra-party competition (Carey and Shugart 1995).

Twitter activities of the legislators in this case study are inherently personal in the first place, as their accounts represent them as individuals. Though their decisions could be due to the respective party's social media mandate, these legislators—not parties—hold the control of their Twitter contents; this explains why both legislators rarely refer to their parties. Only 2% out of Mr. Azis's tweets in February mentioned Golkar, and those tweets hardly discussed anything about Golkar positions and policies in the issues he encountered in DPR; not unusual considering Golkar's policies are usually opportunist and pragmatic (Tomsa 2008). Among the tweets about Golkar, he shared an article by Golkar Institute (a research institute run by Golkar) about the newly created Financial Authority, responded to a compliment by Golkar Academy (the media outlet of the Golkar's Cadre Management Body), and announced Golkar's plan to create a coalition for the upcoming Tanjungpinang mayor election. Even in the case of fuel subsidies discussion, when he supported Golkar's policy position, he did not talk about it in terms of the party's stance.

Although the percentage of Mr. Siddiq's tweets that corresponds to PKS is also considerably low at 9%, his approach when talking about PKS is different as the tweets on PKS presented more programmatic appeal. Aside from his correspondence with various PKS offices in Indonesia and overseas, he also shared the news that PKS plans to provide scholarships for students from Papua (who interestingly are Christian in majority), discussed the most recent public opinion survey by *Lembaga Survei Indonesia* (Indonesia Survey Institute)[21] on political

[21] Lembaga Survei Indonesia. 2012. Perubahan Politik 2014: Trend Sentimen Pemilih pada Partai Politik. Jakarta: Lembaga Survei Indonesia.

parties, announced PKS's dispatchment to aid the Cirebon flood, and supported the decision made by the Bekasi regent from PKS to increase the minimum wage of laborers. Moreover, if one counts his tweets on religious topic as part of PKS's campaign because the party's value is Islam, 15% of Mr. Siddiq's tweets will consist of party-related topics, which is much higher when compared to Mr. Azis's tweets on Golkar. When discussing foreign policy, however, he was similar to Mr. Azis as he did not bring up PKS, though it was obvious that he demonstrated PKS's policy as an Islamic party by disapproving the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from Israel.

The evidence of low number of tweets about parties, and the avoidance to bring up parties' policy positions when talking about political issues, show that social media like Twitter is used by legislators to mobilize personal vote rather than party vote. Party, however, still have influence in how legislators use their social media accounts, as shown by how Mr. Siddiq from PKS talked more about his party compared to Mr. Azis from Golkar, as well as the content of the tweets about their parties.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This thesis begins with the question of what types of legislators use social media as part of their electoral strategies, and has attempted to show that typologies matter in understanding the variation in politicians' social media usage. Using the approaches laid out in the literature of electoral strategies, I collected an original data of 399 DPR legislators' social media usage that encompasses explanatory variables like legislator's attributes, district characteristics, and parties. The purpose of including a large number of variables in the analysis is to control as many variables as possible in order to tease out variables that give clues to legislators' motives in using social media. From the quantitative analysis, I find that *Age* and *Education* are statistically significant, hence confirming Fenno's (1978) argument that personal attributes affect how legislators' use social media to some extent. The findings that *Education Attainment*, *Mandate*, *PKS*, and *Demokra*t are significant also reinforce previous findings that district characteristics and party affiliation shape legislators' electoral strategies (Adler, Gent and Overmeyer's 1998).

The three most important findings, however, are the significance of *Residency*, the significance of *Mandate*, and the insignificance of *Golkar*, as they all suggest that social media is more likely to be used by legislators that adopt policy-based strategies. The negative relationship between *Residency* and Social Media Index shows that legislators who have more valence advantages due to their higher access to constituents are less likely to use social media than those who have less valence advantages. The significance of *Mandate*, on the other hand, highlights the strategical differences between non-institutionalized and institutionalized parties in Indonesia, since the two best-institutionalized parties order their members to include social media in electoral strategies. Despite the correlation between the level of party institutionalization and the type of electoral strategies, there is still a variation between Golkar

and PKS legislators in how they comply with parties' instructions. The analysis on the aspects of party institutionalization provides possible explanations on the difference in legislator's behavior (Tomsa 2008). First, Golkar's value infusion that relies on the party's opportunistic and pragmatist appeals leads its members to be less committed to the party and its rules, compared to PKS's strong Islamic ideology. Second, Golkar's tendency to rely on valence-based strategies, such as patronage, pork, and personal popularity, might be incompatible to social media campaigns, compared to PKS's focus in policy-based strategies; hence the difference in social media usage. To confirm these findings, I conduct a qualitative analysis by studying the contents of two legislators' (one from Golkar, and one from PKS) Twitter websites in February. The case study also confirms that social media complements policy-based strategies, as national issues, that might or might not be related to their DPR Committees, dominate the Twitter timeline of both legislators. Another important finding is that social media is a tool to mobilize personal votes for Indonesian legislators, which corresponds to the literature in electoral system that says intra-party competition due to the open-list PR system will increase the value of personalized campaigns (Carey and Shugart 1995).

The implication of this finding is how rapidly social media is growing as part of politicians' electoral strategies; the dynamic of political campaigns using social media is evident in a new democracy like Indonesia. I speculate that if the trend continues, and if my hypothesis that social media complements policy-based strategies is correct, Indonesian politicians will be encouraged to focus more on policies in their campaigns than the traditional methods of emphasizing on valence characteristics. When candidates focus on policies in their campaigns, it empowers voters as now the constituents can hold politicians responsible for their works, which has been difficult as politicians and voters have been focusing a lot on valence characteristics

that are subjective and hard to account. How much the findings confirm to Fenno's (1998) argument implies that the concept of home style can be applied outside the U.S. or majoritarian system, since Indonesia uses open-list PR system with multimember districts. The lessons of this thesis can also be generalizable to understand the social media and electoral strategies of other new and developing democracies, as long as electoral campaign through social media is not prohibited.

In the future, I would like to test the consistency of this thesis's findings by adding legislators from PDIP and PPP, which I had to exclude due to time constraints, into the dataset. The study of social media and electoral strategies can also be improved by including measures of politicians' social media activeness and popularity into the Social Media Index. Additional data on districts' demographics, such as the heterogeneity of the population and the dominant industries, as well as the completeness of district-level data will aid the district-focused approach greatly in this topic. One could also perform a comparative analysis on politicians' social media usage between new democracies, or study politicians who are holding offices in different branches of government (e.g. the study of presidential candidates' social media usage). The social media trend can also be analyzed to answer puzzles in learning about a country's civil society.

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